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TOWARDS LEGAL UNDERSTANDING: 1I1 
"Men make their own history," including their legal history. But 
they make it "not under conditions chosen by themselves, but under 
conditions found at hand, given and handed down."2 Though they 
never leave conditions as they find them, they adapt old ways and be- 
liefs to new desires and interests, to persist, in spite of changes, in con- 
ditions handed down. 
An outline, necessarily attenuated, of salient changes in legal con- 
ditions in successive periods of Anglo-American history has been car- 
ried to the middle of the nineteenth century. It will be briefly inter- 
rupted for a closer view of an ancient illusion whose moral products, 
handed down through centuries, are factors in the confused legal condi- 
tions of to-day. 
IV 
LEGAL ILLUSION AND JUDICIAL MORES 
Since law began, illusion about it has commonly been considered of 
its essence. All the book theories of the nature of law which Dean 
Pound analyzed in 1921 pictured law as 
"not merely an ordering of human conduct and adjustment of human relations, 
which we have actually given, but something more which we should like to 
have, namely, a doing of these things in a fixed, absolutely predetermined 
way, excluding all merely individual feelings or desires of those by whom 
the ordering and adjustment are carried out."3 
There may always have been persons who knew better. But until lately 
not many would have thought it absurd for a judge to buttress a con- 
troversial decision with assertion that "courts are the mere instruments 
of the law, and can will nothing."4 Condemnation of wilful decisions 
was sometimes widespread and intense. But condemnors usually de- 
nounced judicial legislation as "not law" in preference to conceding that 
law is made by human wills and powers. 
1Continued from the May issue, 34 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 862. Citations to 
the first part will be without title. 
MARX, THE 18TH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE (1869) 1. The phrase 
"not at their own free will" is omitted for the reason that it begs an unanswerable 
question. The hypothesis that men determine their wills in their conditions is as 
tenable as the hypothesis that their wills are determined by their conditions. And 
it comports better with the assumption which we have to make to save our lives 
from inanity-the assumption that we have some power to affect our own destines 
through our choices. 
3 INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922) 71. 
4Marshall, in Osborne v. Bank, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 738, 866 (1824). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.224 on Sat, 15 Jun 2013 20:07:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
1. The Genesis of Legal Illusion 
The view that law is independent of personal wills and powers had 
originally a factual basis. Early law emerged imperceptibly from primi- 
tive folkways.5 In primitive conditions social order rests upon moral 
enforcement, without law, of a complex body of rights of property and 
status and obligations of reciprocity in gifts and services. A Melanesian 
shore dweller, for instance, has a right and duty to function in a fishing 
canoe. After getting his share of a catch of fish (a proportion according 
to his function), he makes a gift of part of it to an inlander. The in- 
lander is expected to reciprocate, when he harvests his crop, with a gift 
of yams-lavish if his crop is large, meagre if it is lean. His obliga- 
tion is measured by his own feelings of fairness, checked by those of 
neighbors who, standing themselves in similar gift relations, applaud 
him if he is generous and shun him if he is mean.6 The power of their 
concurring wills and interests institutes and maintains the right and 
duty. 
Such customary rights and duties seem, to primitive persons, to 
inhere in the nature of things. There was never a time when anything 
but might could establish or maintain rights, whether moral or legal. 
But when the might was that of the harmonious desires, beliefs, and 
feelings of a whole community or folk, it seemed unpersonal. 
Early law seemed so to those who lived under it. In the middle 
ages rapacious powers worked their wills by armed force, without legis- 
lative awareness or intent. Changes by conquest of statuses and their 
incidents were accomplished facts before they got recognized and 
lawful. Folk courts and kings' councils, when they looked for law, found 
and followed norms of right and ways of dealing with disputes which 
had already become customary. No one perceived that power of persons 
had made those norms and ways. It was unthinkable that power of 
persons should change them and make new ones. Once in the tenth 
century on the Continent there was doubt whether a deceased son's 
children should inherit from their grandfather along with their uncles. 
No sovereign power or mere majority of an assembly dared presume to 
pass on the matter. The question, not just the case, was referred to 
God, through battle between champions; and God revealed to men 
the pre-existing law of which they had been unsure.7 
By Bracton's time this metho4 of discovering law was no longer 
trusted. But law thitherto discovered was still a body of norms and 
ways whose rightness was unquestioned by its users. It consisted of 
5 34 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 868-9. 
"MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926) 17-23. 
7 See JENKS, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES (2d ed. 1913) 9. 
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customs, different in different places,8 with whatever changes and sub- 
stitutions (the option of inquest for trial by battle, for instance) just and 
prudent magnates had been correct in deeming suited to obtain "the 
common warrant of the body politic."9 That wilful persons could make 
law was as unthinkable as earlier. Society was incessantly disturbed by 
wilful aggressions and oppressions. But nearly everyone has some 
desire for peace and justice, even though his inconsistent desires for 
aggrandizement are stronger. There were deep and powerful longings 
to escape conditions in which "the will and not the law has dominion."10 
Will and law were conceptual opposites. 
A dependence of law upon the will and power of magnates (i.e., 
such government as there was) had to be conceded. Unless arms main- 
tained them, laws would fail of force, and justice be exterminated."' 
But not even the sovereign's commands were law ipso facto; nothing 
could be law unless it found "common warrant." The king's will could 
not, indeed, be disputed. For every person is under the king, "and he 
is under no person, but only under God." But "he ought to be under 
the law."12 In Bracton's mind, the law could not be affected by his will 
or any other. And the law which Bracton saw manifest in use-a 
corpus juris of usages which were certain and definite, even though 
many of them were unwritten-was not in fact affected by what he saw 
8 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ANGLIAE (c. 1250) (Twiss ed. 1878) vol. i; fol. 1, 
p. 2: "There are also in England several and divers customs according to the 
diversity of places: For the English have many things by custom which they 
have not by written law, as in divers counties, cities, boroughs and vills, where 
it will always have to be inquired, what is the custom of the place, and in what 
manner, they who allege the custom, observe the custom." 
9Ibid. "But it will not be absurd to call the English laws, although they are 
unwritten, by the name of laws, for everything has the force of law, whatever 
has been rightly defined and approved by the counsel and consent of magnates and 
common warrant of the body politic, the authority of the king or prince preceding." 
Ibid. Cf. fol. 2, 12: "Law is the common precept of prudent men in council [or 
consulted?-virorum prudentium consultum], the coercion of offences which are 
committed either voluntarily or through ignorance [and] common warrant of the 
body politic." 
Italics indicate differences of my translation from Twiss's. Bracton's definition 
is taken verbatim from the DIGEST; see MAITLAND, BRACTON AND Azo (1895) 29. 
But what it meant to him, looking at the English scene, was not the same as 
what it meant to Romans. He had seen the King and Council do some legislating, 
normally (even when the King's emolument through fees and amercements was a 
motive) with an eye primarily to what already had, or would surely find "common 
warrant," for the profits of the King's courts depended upon their giving better 
satisfaction to their customers than other courts. Bracton clearly does not con- 
ceive the unwritten laws as dependent upon "prudent men" or "magnates" for any- 
thing except enforcement. They are law in and by common warrant of approving 
feelings throughout the community. No formal action by any definite body of jus- 
tices, members of the Council, or other prudent men or magnates, was pre- 
requisite to legal validity; nor could it give legal validity to anything which failed 
of common warrant. 
0 Ibid. fol. 5b, 38. 
11 Ibid. fol. 1, 2. 
2 Ibid. fol. 5b, 38. 
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as will. Oppression in the main was naked, not legislating or seeking 
cloak from law. It seemed outside of law even when it used courts as 
instruments. For corrupt judges wrote no opinions, and had no maze 
of flexible or alternative doctrines to hide in. Their false judgments 
were force, not law.13 Law still seemed in truth to be found existing, 
and beyond the reach of legislative wills. 
Bracton's desire that law consist of norms and ways which have 
"common warrant of the body politic" seems to be the same that we 
should now express as a desire that law be reasonable-or, less vaguely, 
conduce as much as possible and in the best ways possible (subject to 
whatever may be the limits of practicality under the conditions of the 
time and place) to justice and "general convenience." To Bracton, 
however, "common warrant" was not a moral standard of what law 
ought to be, to be used for guidance of judicial and other legislative 
choices. It was a touchstone by which to recognize the law that is. 
Being a practical man, he knew that there were, and always would 
be, self-willed and stupid judges, insensitive to this touchstone. There- 
fore, if novel cases arise, "let them be judged after a similar case, if 
there have been any." But rarely except in novel cases would there be 
need of new revelations from the touchstone. For when laws and cus- 
toms "have been approved by the consent of those who use them, and 
confirmed by the oath of kings, they cannot be changed or abolished 
without the common consent and counsel of all those by whose common 
consent and counsel they were instituted (promulgatae).'14 They can- 
not be changed, that is, unless the touchstone certifies improvements; 
but "Even without common consent, they may be converted into some- 
thing better; for that which is commuted into something better is not 
abolished." If general convenience conflicts with legal usuals, general 
convenience wins; for law is that which serves it best. 
In the middle ages there was not, at least till later, much obvious 
conflict between general convenience and legal usuals to contradict the 
assumption that an ideal law and law in fact are one and the same 
thing. John's cattle, ranging at large as was right and usual, break 
Robert's hedge and destroy his corn. Robert impounds and keeps the 
cattle till John ransoms them. Since no one wants his own enclosures 
13 Cf. Bracton's complaint, ibid., fol. 1, 4 to the effect that foolish judges who 
ascend the judgment seat without having learned the laws are often led astray by 
magnates (majoribus) who decide causes "rather by their own will than by 
authority of the laws (potius proprio arbitrio quam legum authoritate)." Such 
acts of will are not law and make no law. 
1 Ibid. fol. lb, 8. "Instituted" is obviously not a literal translation of pro- 
mulgatae. But I think it is fairer than "promulgated." Bracton's thinking was 
about English unwritten laws. But for Latin vocabulary he depended on his Roman 
authors. At this point he had before him Azo's preface, which speaks of imperial laws as promulgatis; MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 9, at 10. 
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broken, Robert's course is approved by unanimous feelings of justice, 
unconfused by ratiocination about the dependence of liability upon 
fault.15 Law found Robert's right to impound cattle damage feasant 
and John's to redeem. It did not make those rights. And the judge 
who first discovered that it would find common warrant to permit 
Robert to recover damages without impounding was not conspicuously 
legislating. Judicial as well as royal legislation sometimes took wider 
jumps from prior legal usuals. But legislation was usually informed 
by an accurate sense of what would find common warrant in the approv- 
ing feelings of nearly all whom it affected. Therefore it gave no deep 
shocks to the faith, handed down from primitive conditions, that law 
is untouchable by human wills. 
Even in the middle ages, however, hard-headedness might occa- 
sionally deny that faith. In a case called Langbridge's16 in the four- 
teenth century the question was whether a donee by deed of a remainder 
in fee could protect his future interest by intervening in an action be- 
tween a demandant, claiming title in fee, against a tenant in possession 
for term of life who had "made default after default." There was 
precedent for intervention where the intervenor's title was "by fine," 
and so of judicial record. But here the would-be intervenor's deed in 
pais had no such solemn status. And this distinction had been said, and 
very likely held, to be material.17 Nevertheless, said Sharshulle, J., the 
mere difference in solemnity between recorded fine and deed in pais 
should not bar the intervention.18 The ensuing colloquy is famous: 
' VINOGRADOFF, CUSTOM AND RIGHT (1925) 88. Cf. HOLMES, COMMON LAW 
(1881) 10, 116-9, 156; Isaacs, Fault and Liability, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS (1924) 235; Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts, ibid. 18. For 
the development of remedies for damages by cattle under modern conditions 
analogous to those in primitive communities see Delaney v. Erickson, 10 Neb. 492 (1880). 
In the origin of customary liabilities, or rather, remedial procedures, there 
is no "principle" either of liability for fault or that "a man acts his peril." 
Basic is the resentment of the sufferer at his own loss. He and neighbors may or 
may not impute fault to the causer. Commonly enough they do. But whether 
a remedial procedure develops does not depend on that. It depends on the 
neighbors' interested sympathies. If it seems to them that they are themselves 
more likely to suffer than to inflict a similar loss in the ordinary course of their 
affairs, their sympathies are with the sufferer, and there develops, through their 
"common warrant," a right way of going after relief. The right of sufferers to 
resort to that right way is felt as just; and recognition of it conduces to general 
convenience. 
6 Y. B. 18-19. Ed. III, Pike ed. Rolls Ser.; (1344-5) 374. 
17Probably claimants under deeds in pais had often and consistently been 
excluded from intervening. Feeling of the peculiar sanctity of court records doubt- 
less contributed to maintain the distinction between claimants by record and 
claimants by deed. But there was sense in it. A recorded fine was good proof 
of title. The authentication of a deed was by the donor's seal. And forgery of 
seals was common. There were monasteries which systematically counterfeited 
every seal of which the monks could get an impression. 
18 He added this: "No precedent is of such force as that which is right (or rea- 
sonable?-nulle ensaumple est si fort come resoun)." 
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"Thorpe [objecting counsel]. I think you will do as others have done in 
the same case, or else we do not know what the law is. HILLARY, J. It 
is the will of the Justices. STONORE, J. No; law is right reason (Nanyl; 
ley est resoun)." 
Hillary apparently submitted to be silenced. What had he to gain 
by insisting on his heresy? It does not appear that his will differed 
from those of the other justices. The wills which prevailed were to 
follow the precedent for permitting intervention when to do so seemed 
conducive to justice and general convenience. The earlier limitation of 
intervention to cases where the intervenor's title was incontestably 
proved by record had accorded with views of justice and general con- 
venience prevailing formerly, but no longer. Had the concept of 
changing conditions been developed, orthodoxy might, as to-day, have 
explained the overruling of the limitation by saying that conditions had 
changed, not law. So long as law was kept accordant with the desires 
and feelings of those it served, it was idle to debate whether the accord 
was due to human wills or transcendental powers of Law's own. Noth- 
ing important could be gained by effort to dislodge illusion. 
2. Perennial Cross Currrents of Judicial Propriety. 
Mores: "Ways of doing things which are current in a society to satisfy 
human needs and desires, together with the faiths, notions, codes, and stand- 
ards of well living which inhere in those ways, having a genetic connection 
with them."19 Any way or standard is moral, as the word will be used here, 
if resort to it is compatible with good repute in a society, class, or group. 
Mores of subgroups: "Each class or group in a society has its own mores. 
This is true of ranks, professions, industrial classes, religious and philosophi- 
cal sects, and all other subdivisions of society. Individuals are in two or more 
of these groups at the same time, so that there is compromise and neutraliza- 
tion. Other mores are common to the whole society. Mores are also trans- 
mitted from one class to another."2 
Variability and diversity of mores: "No less remarkable than the per- 
sistency of . . . mores is their changeableness and variation."2 Consistency 
is not to be assumed for the mores of any society or group. There are moral 
ways of deviating from moral ways. 
9 SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906) 59. This seems the least unsatisfactory of 
Sumner's definitions of mores, which are easy to perceive but hard to describe 
comprehensively. The other definitions make prevalence of a supposition that they 
are conducive to societal welfare the test of whether ways, etc., are moral; ibid., 
at 30; 1 SUMNER AND KELLER, SCIENCE OF SOCIETY (1927) 34. Ways which are 
believed conducive to personal or class welfare usually are claimed, and often 
considerably felt to be conducive to societal welfare. But the real test of the 
morality (as that word is here used) of a way seems to be whether, in the group 
which most matters to him, a man incurs no diminution of reputation by following 
it. Ruthlessness and brutality are clearly moral among gangsters. 
" Ibid. 39. 
21 Ibid. 84. 
22In Melanesia, inheritance is matrilineal. On a man's death the moral right 
way for his property to go is to his maternal uncle, brother or nephew. But he 
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Though illusion about the nature of law is metaphysical, its prac- 
tical effects have been moral. 
For centuries the prevalence of illusion strengthened moral pres- 
sures upon judges to resist partisan desires. Cannot has more rhetorical 
and emotional force than ought not; no power than no right.2 De facto 
human powers are in fact restrained by belief that they are non-existent. 
Saying that judges cannot legislate means only that they ought not, and 
does not prevent every decision from being in fact a legislative choice. 
But widespread conviction that judges cannot legislate, especially when 
they shared it, made them choose in general to give effect to what would 
be taken to be compulsion of Impersonal Law. 
The surest and easiest way for a judge to seem, even to himself, 
to intrude no will of his own was by doing "what others have done in 
the same case," or, if the case was novel, to judge "after a similar case 
if there have been any"-in other words, to decide as if mechanically 
controlled by legal usuals. To do so was normal from the beginning, 
when legal usuals were in close accord with harmonious popular feelings 
of right and justice. The rightness of doing so was always in the judi- 
cial mores. For a while in the early history of the so-called "common" 
law of the king's courts,24 a near duty of converting legal usuals into 
"something better" was also in those mores; and changes well calculated 
to win common warrant were fairly frequent.25 But when a professional 
lawyer class arose, trained like Thorpe to "know what the law is" by 
study of precedents, its pressure was for undeviating consistency with 
"settled" ways. Judges chosen from that class rarely used Bracton's 
touchstone. They have felt for the most part that their professional 
respectability would be endangered if they did so. 
In the common law before Lord Mansfield, Langbridge's Case26 is 
almost unique in its open resort to "natural reason," as distinguished 
naturally wants it to go to his own son. It is morally permissible for an influen- 
tial father to put property in his son for the father's life; and often, probably 
without more, the son may succeed in keeping it after his father's death. But the 
right way to clinch the son's retention of the property is to marry him (the incest 
taboos extend only to cousins on the mother's side) to his father's brother's daugh- 
ter-technically, "cross-cousin marriage." Malinowski, op. cit. supra note 6, 100- 
111. 
The moral permission to violate taboos on incest with remote maternal cousins 
has become considerable. The right way to make sure of the propriety of the incest is by making magic. Ibid. 79-80. 
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), uses power through- 
out where it is plain that all he can sensibly mean is right. Locke is the authority for use of the same trick in American constitutions. 
The king's courts had little concern with other litigants than land-hold- 
ing gentry. Borough and other popular courts remained vital at least uritil the 
sixteenth century. 
5 G. B. ADAMS, COUNCIL AND COURTS IN ANGLo-NORMAN ENGLAND (1926) c. 7. 
26 Supra note 16. 
1047 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.224 on Sat, 15 Jun 2013 20:07:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
from "the artificial reason of the law,"27 for justification of innovation. 
Though the professional mores have tenaciously retained the illusion 
that law is found, not made, the general run of judges and lawyers- 
the carriers of the judicial mores28-have always assumed that the one 
right way to find it is in precedents, narrowly construed. Some of the 
few judges who have conceived Impersonal Law as seated in reason- 
ableness for justice and general convenience have gained great prestige 
by looking there for it with results that won common warrant. But for 
all their eminence and influence, they have been impotent to lodge their 
conception in the mbres. For it would imply duty to look always be- 
yond precedents to reasonableness in finding law. The mores have 
easily resisted acceptance of so difficult a duty. The most they have 
conceded is a limited privilege or permission of occasional resort to 
reasonableness. The paramount duty in mores is to behave as if bound 
by settled usuals. The privilege of occasional deviation is a moral in- 
consistency. 
A tendency of conscientious performance of this duty may be il- 
lustrated by an early Year Book case :29 
"A brought a writ of nuisance against B. B. What nuisance? A. Sir, 
we tell you that whereas there was a foss and a hedge around my corn, so that 
cattle might not eat it, there he has abated the foss, so that cattle enter there, 
etc. Howard. Let his admission be entered on the roll; and thereby he is 
foreclosed forever from the soil of this foss; for he supposes by his plaint that 
the soil is ours. Spigornel. We tell you that we enclosed our corn with a 
foss; and he came and abated it; ready, etc. Howard. And we pray judgment 
of his admission that the foss which was abated is his own foss. Judgment 
if such a writ lie in this case. 
"It was adjudged that it did not; and therefore it was quashed." 
Since the foss was on his own land, not B's, A should have used a writ 
of curia claudenda instead of nuisance. The "admission" inferred from 
his error may, as Howard claimed, have shifted title to the soil of the 
foss to B. Such a result would have shocked no common lawyer. Con- 
siderations of justice or general convenience had become normally ir- 
relevant to "what the law is." 
2 Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Coke Rep. 63b (1608). 8 Cf. SUMNER, op. cit. supra note 19, at 46. "The masses are the real bearers 
of the mores. They carry tradition. The folkways are their ways. They accept 
influence or leadership, and they imitate, but they... [remain] controlled by 
their notions and tastes previously acquired .... What the classes adopt, be it 
good or ill, may be found pervading the mass after generations, but it will appear 
as a resultant of all the vicissitudes of the folkways in the interval. ... It is the 
classes who produce variation; it is the masses who carry forward the traditional 
mores." 
2Y.B. 21 Ed. I (1292) 224. 
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Langbridge's Case, in which reason prevailed, was an instance of 
deviation from legal moral obligation. The judicial mores have retained 
always a permission of such deviation, within changing limits never 
precisely definable in words, but capable of fairly accurate perception 
by judges sensitive to states of popular and judicial moral feeling and of 
social pressures. "The Nature of the Judicial Process" is given largely 
to effort to make words describe as accurately as words can the present 
limits of permissible deviation from present legal usuals, as Cardozo, 
not without idealization, senses those limits. 
In the later middle ages deviation (legal innovation) was morally 
permissible when it was sensed that it would be welcome generally 
(Assumpsit,30 Trover31) or to important interests whose approval would 
outweigh objections (Uses, Fines and Recoveries32), provided it would 
increase the business of the courts. But the pace of change was slow, 
and many usuals persisted long after they had lost common warrant if 
they had ever had it. In the swiftly changing conditions of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries dissatisfactions with such persisting usuals 
became intense and widespread. And there were powerful pressures for 
supplementing, if not superseding, the common lawyers' moral standards 
with those of a Natural Justice unbound by rule or precedent.33 But the 
class of judges and lawyers which had throughout maintained the me- 
dieval professional mores was re-established in undisputed control of 
law by the seventeenth century settlement. General acceptance of the 
fiction of "common consent" to law and government34 made it thence- 
forth easy to baffle legal criticism by representing legal usuals as estab- 
lished by and existing with "common warrant of the body politic," and 
30 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) Lect. vi. 
31JENKS, SHORT HIST. OF ENG. LAW (1912) 141-2. 
32 Ibid. 95-101, 115-118. 
3 34 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 872-3. DOCTOR AND STUDENT (1523) came early in this movement; HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651) came at its end. HOBBES Pt. ii, c. 
26, is to this effect: Law is what the sovereign commands. His blanket 
command, subject to such exceptions as he makes by statute, is that subjects be 
governed by the "law of nature," which is that men deal equitably, with mutual 
consideration for one another. The commands of that law are clear to all who, 
without partiality and passion, make use of natural reason; "yet considering 
there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self-love or 
some other passion, it is now become of all laws the most obscure." Therefore, 
since "there is no judge subordinate nor sovereign but may err in a judgment of 
equity, if afterward in another like case he find it more consonant to equity to 
give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to do it. No man's error becomes his own 
law; nor obliges him to persist in it." Nor does it become a law to other judges. 
"All the sentences of precedent judges that have ever been cannot altogether make 
a law contrary to natural equity: nor any examples of former judges can warrant 
an unreasonable sentence, or discharge the present judge of studying what is 
equity, in the case he is to judge, from the principles of his own natural reason." 
34The eighteenth century revolutions so clinched this fiction in general mores 
that Bentham's exhibition of its absurdity-FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (1776) 
Pt. iv-made little practical impression. 
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changeable only by statute, as provided in the Social Contract. More- 
over, changes in legal usuals concurred with eighteenth century tran- 
quillity in making legal criticism rare and lenient. But the singleness of 
judicial moral obligation continued-obligation to decide as if bound 
by rules and precedents regardless of their repugnance in many instances 
to the interests and moral feelings of most non-lawyers. Though Lord 
Mansfield, by breaking them, stretched for a time the limits within 
which innovation was professionally respectable, in the period of re- 
action which followed35 those limits shrank again. 
Permission of departure from paramount legal-moral obligation is 
forced into the judicial mores, and its limits widened or narrowed, by 
pressures for interests moralized by other classes in conditions in which 
their power approaches dominance in society. Lord Mansfield was 
backed and approved by such tremendous power, especially in the com- 
mercial middle class, that legal-moral condemnation seemed idle cack- 
ling.36 He did not have to take the trouble to simulate consistency with 
legal usuals. 
But not even a Mansfield risks any moral censure lightly. And 
ordinarily, judicial legislative freedom is morally permissible only when 
its inconsistency with legal-moral right and duty is inconspicuous. 
Piece-meal leglislation, as when assumpsit was developed, easily escapes 
attention. Moral permission of more drastic legislation is usually sub- 
ject to the condition that its character be veiled.37 Formerly the veiling 
might be by flagrant fiction.38 The preference latterly has been for more 
subtle verbal magic. The veils have often been thin. But until the 
twentieth century, since few bothered to look through them, they suf- 
ficed to prevent very much perception of the existence of legal moral 
inconsistency. 
V 
THE CONFUSION OF AMERICAN JUDICIAL WAYS 
1. Permissible Judicial Freedom before the Civil War 
"Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect 
to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect . . . to 
the will of the law."39 
Marshall's enormous statement at least states truly an ideal which 
was rarely challenged after Kent and others had taught homespun 
35 See DICEY, LAW AND OPINION (1905), chapter on "Old Toryism." See LORD CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES (1899): Lord Mansfield, 
Vol. iv. c. 34. 
7 Cf. note 22 supra. 8 See JENKS, op. cit. supra note 31, at 175 ff. (ejectment), 162 ("color"), 
170 ff. (jurisdictional fictions). 
Marshall, in Osborne v. Bank, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 738, 866 (1824), cited supra 
note 4. 
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judges to consult Blackstone, if nothing else, before deciding cases. The 
administration of rough and ready justice and injustice without regard 
for law in books became professionally disreputable, even if it continued 
fairly frequent. It was generally felt that Marshall's statement ought 
to be true-that the "will of the law," as revealed by authorities in law 
books, ought always to control judicial power. It commonly did con- 
trol, except when some stronger motive than feeling that the law was 
unjust or harsh led courts to enforce some will of their own or of im- 
pressive litigant or counsel. But of course, whatever will controlled the 
making of a precedent by a court to which respect was due, after the 
precedent was made the will expressed in it was thenceforth, while it 
stood, the law's. 
Docility to authority was both morally obligatory and common- 
probably usual. From the beginning, however, it was morally permissi- 
ble to "adapt" the common law to American conditions. And judicial 
legislation for other objects was often conspicuous, especially in con- 
stitutional cases. To Jeffersonians its object seemed sometimes to be the 
substitution of British for American conditions.0 For the consciences 
of conscientious judges were not less sensitive to the mores of their 
social class than to those of their profession, and the most influential of 
them, whatever they called themselves politically, were members of the 
class whose mores had accepted Hamiltonian ideals and standards. Be- 
ing practical men not prey to introspection, and sure that what they did 
was somehow righteous, they could usually give legal effect to a debat- 
able view of social interest without qualms of inconsistency with their 
legal-moral duty. 
Qualms were sometimes experienced, however. For Shaw, one of 
the most hard-headed and practical judges of the lot, resorted to the 
magic of transcendental metaphysics to allay them. Impersonal Law, as 
he conceived it, only seems to be contained in a palpable corpus juris of 
authorities. In its true reality it exists somewhere else-in a few broad 
principles of reason, natural justice, and "that general convenience 
which is public policy,"41 of which more definite legal norms and usages 
are but ephemeral manifestations, necessary for practical purposes, but 
not really law at all. Marshall, dealing with the Constitution instead of 
the common law, had similarly found true reality brooding above or 
behind "particular provisions" in "general principles common to free 
institutions."42 
0 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Ford, 1892-9) 268; 4 ibid. 87 ff., 105; 
10 ibid. 34 ff., 143 ff. Nelles, The First American Labor Case (1931) 41 YALE 
L. J. 165, 168 ff. 1 Norway Plains Co. v. B. & M. R. Co., 1 Gray 263, 267 (Mass. 1854); 34 
COLUMBIA LAW REV. 884 ff. 
4 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U.S.) 87, 133-9 (1810); 34 COLUMBIA LAW 
REV. 882 ff. 
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Utterance of such doctrines from high places contributed to moralize 
judicial legislation. But transcendental conceptions are chiefly useful 
for spiritual solace. Shaw himself felt that law in its incorporeal 
essence "would be too vague and uncertain for practical purposes, in the 
various and complicated cases, of daily occurrence, in the business of an 
active community." To rest decisions nakedly upon higher principles 
would, moreover, have been legal-morally shocking. Judicial legislation 
was more stimulated by its practice than by rationalizing theory. And 
judges looked rather to precedents than to higher principles for informa- 
tion about the limits within which they could legislate without impro- 
priety provided they cloaked their legislation with decent semblance of 
compulsion by precepts of the palpable corpus juris of precedents and 
constitutional and statutory provisions. 
The most conspicuous precedents for judicial legislation were aimed 
to promote business convenience or the increase or security of private 
wealth. Old impediments to dealings by or with corporations, for in- 
stance, broke down rather easily, in spite of even Marshall's opposition43 
and the considerableness of surviving feeling that corporations were too 
dangerous to be suffered to deal freely.44 A judicial relaxation of a 
harsh old rule of evidence would, however, have been unthinkable.45 
It came to be felt as not improper for judges to legislate, if not too 
nakedly, for wealth or business. This limit was not inflexible. Shaw, 
3 See his dissent in Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 64 (1827). 
4 In the view which came down from the past, a corporation was an imperium in imperio; a government indiscriminately profuse in grants of the special privilege 
of incorporation would endanger itself and destroy the freedom of its people. 
Corporations were recognized as proper for some public objects-government of 
municipalities or colonies, religious, educational or eleemosynary purposes, develop- 
ment of foreign trade; later for a few sorts of enterprises of "great and general 
utility," requiring more capital than partners could assemble-banking, insurance, 
turnpikes, canals, water supply. But it was reasonable to charter such a business 
corporation only when "all the operations are capable of being reduced to what 
is called a Routine, or to such uniformity of method as admits of little or no varia- 
tion." For "negligence and profusion must always prevail, more or less," in cor- 
porate management. Charters should be granted sparingly, and always contain 
strict limitations of powers. For when business corporations "have been allowed 
to act according to their natural genius, they have always, in order to confine the 
competition to as small a number of persons as possible, endeavored to subject the 
trade to many burdensome restrictions." ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(1776) Bk. v, c. 1, Pt. iii, art. i. Cf. Baldwin, Amer. Business Corporations before 
1789, Two CENTURIES GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1901) 261; HENDERSON, POSI- 
TION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (1918) c. 2. 
Until the middle of the nineteenth century this view was orthodox in general 
mores, and was usually treated with respect on paper; note Marshall's deference to 
it in the Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518 (1819). But owing to 
the facility with which charters could be had by bribing legislators, fact got pretty 
far from theory. This was said in 1832: "There is scarcely an individual of re- 
spectable character in our community [Boston], who is not a member of, at least, 
one private company which is incorporated." ANGELL AND AMES, CORPORATIONS 
(lst ed. 1832) 35. 
'34 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 886-9. 
1052 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.224 on Sat, 15 Jun 2013 20:07:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TOWARDS LEGAL UNDERSTANDING: II 
for example, sometimes went beyond it, with genuine devotion to the 
ethical ideal implicit in his metaphysical fantasia. But few other early 
judges were so daring, or had such accurate perceptions of what would 
come nearest to finding common warrant in a society whose members 
were coming more and more to differ in feelings of right and justice 
and judgments of general convenience. 
2. The Moral Rebellion of the Supreme Court 
In the judicial mores which came down into the restless social 
conditions after the Civil War, obligation to submit unquestioningly to 
authority was still paramount. And faith in the impersonalness of law 
was strong in popular mores. It seemed imperative that judges should 
always at least seem to be bound by law. Feeling of a limited permissi- 
bility of reasonable legal "adaptation" or innovation was confined to the 
judicial class. The public recognized no such permission. Conspicuous 
instances of judicial legislation, unless general approval blinded the 
public to their legislative character, in fact endangered the prestige 
and respectability of the courts. Judges felt that conspicuous frequency 
of inconspicuous judicial legislation would do likewise. Of course, in 
cases where the voices of authority were silent or conflicting, the neces- 
sity of judicial legislation was inescapable. And in a society in which 
acquisitive appetites had become dominant, judicious adaptations of law 
to business convenience or prosperity, even if contrary to authority, were 
sometimes safe because approved by nearly all who mattered. But even 
for this object judicial legislation must not be conspicuously frequent. 
It must not conspicuously occur at all for other objects, except on very 
rare occasions when extremely powerful pressures of interest and 
opinion seemed to justify the risk. In general, authority, if clear, ought 
to be followed mechanically, regardless of its consistency with feelings 
of justice or views of general convenience. 
In the period of Reconstruction and accelerated industrial expan- 
sion, the Supreme Court found it impossible to keep its practice in ac- 
cord with the requirement of this complex of standards. It was inces- 
santly confronted with cases in which its members' human sympathies 
and social interests and convictions were at war both inter sese and with 
their feelings of judicial expediency or propriety. 
On the Legal Tender question, the interests and Hamiltonian con- 
victions of the successful acquisitive class, with which judges have 
commonly been sympathetic, conflicted bitterly with popular interests and 
convictions. The decision adverse to the Legal Tender Acts was vir- 
tually on "general principles"46-conspicuously legislative, and scandal- 
Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 603 (1870). 
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ous in popular opinion. The decision which came on its heels seemed 
as flagrantly legislative, since it overruled the other; and even more 
scandalous, since it was thought that new justices had been appointed to 
the Court with the deliberate purpose of procuring it.47 
As to Reconstruction, the personal sympathies of the judges were 
with the southern whites, and the social inexpediency of perpetuating 
carpet-bag and negro domination appalled them. Yet such would have 
been the tendency of giving effect to the intention of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Congressional Reconstruction Acts. However wise the 
statesmanship of the Court in refusing to construe the Amendment48 and 
the statutes49 as intended, it outraged a vast deal of northern sentiment. 
And it was obvious even to those who approved the statesmanship that 
the Court was legislating. 
These conspicuous controversial decisions shook both the Court's 
prestige and popular faith that judicial power is never exercised except 
to give effect to Impersonal Law. Awareness of this doubtless con- 
tributed to keep the Court generally reluctant, when southern questions 
were not involved, to hold statutes unconstitutional or make drastic 
legal innovations. But the pull of other feelings against those which 
inclined the justices to submit to authority was sometimes too strong for 
them. 
They had to deal, for instance, with a vast number of cases involv- 
ing the validity of municipal bonds.50 The bonds had usually been 
issued to promoters in exchange for stock in projected railways. This 
was a corrupt racket, and not the least demoralizing of the acquisitive 
shamelessnesses of the Gilded Age.5' The avidity of towns and counties 
7 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 457 (1872). See 2 WARREN, SUPREME 
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (2d ed. 1926) c. 31. 48 In the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36 (1873), the justices were 
racked by a variety of pulls. Sympathy for southern whites under carpet-bag 
domination (of whose evils the subjection of the butchers of New Orleans to the 
slaughterhouse monopoly was an instance) contributed to induce the dissenters to 
insist that the monopoly was unconstitutional, and the majority to give narrow 
construction to the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States"; 
a broad construction would have tended to commit them to sustaining Reconstruc- 
tion statutes. They were swayed also by feelings for and against the policy of 
extending judicial censorship of state legislation by adopting so vague a standard 
of constitutionality as the "rights of man" or "common right and reason"; cf. 
Field's restatement of his position in Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 
111 U. S. 746 (1883). The conventional judicial moral obligation to give effect 
to the "original and intended meaning" of the Fourteenth Amendment scarcely 
counted at all. 
4E.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875); United States v. 
Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1875); United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629 (1883); Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883). 
50For an impression of the number of bonds-for-stock cases with which the 
Supreme Court dealt, see the volume indices, under the title "Municipal Bonds," 
from 1864 (1 Wall.) to 1890. 
61 For the mores of the aggressively acquisitive class at the period, see CHARLES 
FRANCIS ADAMS, A CHAPTER OF ERIE (1869); MARK TWAIN & C. D. WARNER, 
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for railway service and the venality of their officials made it easy to 
work. Often enough the railways were never built. Whether they 
were or not, insiders got much or most of the proceeds of the bonds, and 
the stock was worthless. 
Judges often disliked enforcing the obligations of such bonds 
against swindled municipalities, and occasionally resorted to rather 
sharp lawyering to avoid it.52 But statutes authorizing cities and coun- 
ties to issue their bonds for the "public purpose" of capitalizing pro- 
jected railways had nearly everywhere, at the beginning, been held valid 
by state courts. The authority of Fletcher v. Peck53 forbade invalida- 
tion of the bonds for fraud or failure of consideration. Ordinarily the 
only chance to avoid their obligation was to find some irregularity in 
statutory prerequisites (usually including approval by vote) to their 
issuance. Numerous cases which went to the Supreme Court from in- 
ferior federal courts turned on questions of due compliance with statu- 
tory prerequisites. Though probabilities of legally unprovable irregu- 
larities and frauds are strongly suggested by the reported facts, the 
technical case for the municipality, in view of settled rules, was usually 
weak. The bonds were almost invariably sustained, with not infrequent 
dissents by single sympathetic justices. 
The state of legal-moral feeling was not unlike that during the 
sixteenth century disputation between strict common lawyers and ad- 
vocates of flexible equity. In a then famous moot case54 an obligor 
had paid his obligation on the day, but taken no formal acquittance. The 
obligee sued at law for a second payment. The idea that equity should 
protect the obligor from his own "folly and negligence" was horrifying 
to sixteenth century common lawyers. The idea of changing settled legal 
rules to prevent injustice to the millions of victims of the railway 
THE GILDED AGE (1873); H. D. LLOYD, WEALTH AGAINST COMMONWEALTH 
(1894); IDA M. TARBELL, HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904); 
THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS (1918) c. 14-20; 3 PARRIN.GTON, MAIN CUR- 
RENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1930) 3-47. 
53 See Oelrich v. Pittsburgh, Fed. Cas. No. 10,442 (W. D. Pa. 1859), where 
Justice Grier seized the opportunity to delay if not defeat a bondholder who had 
not got his bonds transferred on the books of the issuing city. The opinion con- 
tains an interesting resume of the prior history of the bonds-for-stock practice. 
At first the states had issued such bonds lavishly. The corruption and fraud were 
notorious. But "the expenditure of such immense sums made flush times, and 
all were delighted with the system"-until there was a panic and some of the 
states went bankrupt. When the railroad mania returned with prosperity-"when 
it was anticipated that every railroad from any place to another place, or no place, 
would produce large profits on the investment, would convert villages into cities, 
and every city a London, ... the state being unwilling to involve herself in 
further debt, and risk a second insolvency, the scheme of city, county and borough 
subscriptions was invented and put into practice." 
536 Cranch (U. S.) 87 (1810), cited supra note 42. 
4Replication of a Serjeant (c. 1525), published with DOCTOR AND STUDENT, 
supra note 33 (ed. Cincinnati, 1874) 343-7. 
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promoters was as repugnant to most nineteenth century judges.55 Oc- 
casionally, however, a court responded to pressure for equity. The 
Supreme Court of Iowa, overruling its own prior decisions, held that 
municipalities had no constitutional power to issue bonds in exchange 
for railway stock. But the Supreme Court of the United States forbade 
the federal courts in Iowa to accept the state court's holding as state 
law, using language which might, mutatis mutandis, have been written 
by the sixteenth century Serjeant. "We shall never," it said, "immolate 
truth, justice, and the law, because a state tribunal has erected the altar 
and decreed the sacrifice."56 
Nevertheless, a few years later, the Supreme Court itself found a 
way to protect the people of a city from paying taxes to meet the obliga- 
tion of bonds regularly issued as authorized by statute. The case, Loan 
Association v. Topeka,57 is distinguishable only in that the bonds at- 
tacked were issued to subsidize a bridge factory instead of a railway. 
The opinion went on the ground that "to lay with one hand the power of 
the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to be- 
stow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up 
private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the 
forms of law and is called taxation." The statute authorizing the bond 
issue was therefore violative of implied constitutional limitations "which 
grow out of the essential nature of all free governments"; and the 
bonds invalid. 
The justice and reasonableness of the decision were scarcely dis- 
putable. But since the meaning of "due process of law" had not yet 
been changed, there could be no pretence that it was authorized by any 
constitutional provision. By Marshall's standards the decision itself 
was an impairment of the obligation of contract. Justice Clifford's elo- 
quent dissent was scarcely needed to make most of the other justices 
uneasy at their flagrant breach of conventional propriety. There were 
shreds of prior authority for holding statutes unconstitutional on "gen- 
eral principles"58--but not enough to make it seem quite legal to do so. 
The possibility of expanding the Due Process clause beyond its literal 
5 Those victims included thousands who had subscribed individually for 
worthless railway stock as well as the taxpayers of municipalities which had done 
so. A farmer who, falling for the wiles of a stock salesman, had mortgaged his farm to secure payment of a subscription, had not a chance to save his farm in a 
court of equity unless he could prove that the salesman's lies were such as would 
have fooled much wiser men than he. Sawyer v. Prickett, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 146 (1873). In such a case the justices of the Supreme Court would no more have 
dreamed of changing settled rules than would the sixteenth century Serjeant. 
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. (U.S.) 175 (1864). 57 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655 (1875). The opinion was by Justice Miller, who had 
dissented in Gelpcke v. Dubuque. 8 See 34 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 882; and Corwin, The "Higher Law" Back- 
ground of American Constitutional Law (1928-29) 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365. 
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meaning was already in the air. After Loan Association v. Topeka all 
the justices probably found seductive the notion of adding to the Consti- 
tution what would amount to an express authorization to nullify statutes 
on the ground of extreme obnoxiousness. Such authority as there 
was for such a reading of the Due Process clause was not, to be sure, 
in good repute.59 On no occasion did the Court discuss the propriety 
of that reading. But never again, after the Slaughter House Cases,60 
did any justice hint denial that that reading was correct. Not for 
twenty years, however, did the court take the drastic step of resting 
a decision of unconstitutionality upon it.61 
Commencing with Munn v. Illinois,62 the powerful pressure of 
economic class interest was for doing so. From the depression of the 
'70's onward "the inequalities in the condition of men" were increas- 
ingly "marked and disturbing"; there was widespread uneasiness lest 
"enormous aggregations of wealth . . . encroach upon the rights and 
crush out the business of individuals of small means."63 From these 
premises Justice Field in 1890 drew this conclusion: as unrest increases 
"it becomes more and more the imperative duty of the court" unhesitat- 
ingly to enforce what he called, consistently with his dissenting opin- 
ions,64 "constitutional" guaranties of private rights-meaning concep- 
tually absolute and abstractly equal imprescriptible "natural rights" of 
concretely unequal persons, for practical purposes substantially the same 
as rights theretofore enjoyed at common law or recognized in the mores 
of generations of economic pygmies. The first holding of unconstitu- 
59 Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law before the Civil War (1911) 
24 HARv. L. REV. 366, 460. The only opinion in the Supreme Court in which the 
doctrine of "substantive" due process had been used before the Civil War was 
Taney's in the Dred Scott case, 19 How. (U. S.) 393, 450 (1856); the only later 
use was Chase's in Hepburn v. Griswold, supra note 46, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 603, 
622-6 (1870). In both, "substantive" due process was a mere make-weight. 0 16 Wall. 36, 80-81 (1873). 6 Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment (1909) 7 
MrCH. L. REv. 643. 
6294 U. S. 113 (1876). For illustration of the heat with which the decisions 
in the Granger cases were assailed in the "conservative" press, see 2 Warren, op. 
cit. supra note 47, at 581 ff. It seems never to have been strongly argued that 
there was then no provision of the Federal Constitution (unless the Contract 
Clause as construed by Marshall) under which the validity of the Granger legis- 
lation was open to question. If there is any reality at all in the theory that con- 
stitutional construction is of the "original intent and meaning" of provisions, the 
argument would have been unanswerable. See Corwin, op. cit. supra note 59. Cf. 
Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution (1934) 34 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 1. It 
was already assumed, however, that legislation adverse to powerful economic 
interests presents a constitutional question ipso facto. 
Address to the N. Y. State Bar Association, Feb. 4, 1890, pamphlet, bound 
as No. 28 in vol. ii of Justice Field's personal collection of his OPINIONS AND PA- 
PERS, now the property of Professor Frederick C. Hicks. 64 See Nelles, review of SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD (1930), Book Review 
(1931) 40 YALE L. J. 998. 
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tionality under the expanded Due Process clause established those rights, 
for a while, as constitutional.65 But reasonableness had theretofore 
been the standard of constitutionality under the expanded Due Process 
clause during the twenty years in which statutes attacked under it 
had consistently been sustained.66 It presently re-appeared as the stand- 
ard.67 And though undue unreasonableness and invasion of natural 
rights have since alternated as criteria of unconstitutionality, the former 
seems finally to have prevailed. 
3. Reasonableness v. Stare Decisis and the Constitution as Written 
In the conditions of the last third of the nineteenth century the 
members of the Supreme Court were by no means the only judges who 
often felt oppressed by the narrowness of inherited bounds of judicial 
propriety. And the example of the Supreme Court was moral prece- 
dent for greatly increased freedom in dealing with cases as seemed to 
judges right or reasonable. 
Two cases in the Taney period are typical of ways which con- 
scientious judges then felt morally obliged to follow-ways which still, 
in spite of eighty years' attrition, stand as right in many minds. A pub- 
lic highway, not in use, ran betwveen two farmers' wheat fields. To save 
fencing, they ran a single fence along its middle, each erecting half. 
The first to harvest his crop at once took down his half of the fence, 
and his cattle crossed over and destroyed the other's standing wheat. 
There was no possible doubt about the law. To erect the fence in the 
highway was an unlawful act. To take it down was a lawful act. 
Therefore the destruction of wheat ensuing was damnum absque injuria. 
"Mischievous motives make a bad act worse, but they cannot make that 
wrong which in its own essence is lawful."68 Similarly, when a bank 
systematically accumulated bank-notes issued by a rival bank, and 
plunged the rival into difficulties by presenting them for redemption all 
at once, of course no action lay in 1854.69 In such cases rules were 
definite and rights were absolute. To bend them to justice would have 
outraged professional propriety. It would have been clearly outside the 
unclear limits of permissible judicial freedom. 
Within fifty years, however, judges were beginning to say that 
even "lawful acts" are unlawful if they cause loss, unless they were 
5 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897). 
66E.g., in the Granger cases, supra note 62; Spring Valley Water Works v. 
Schottler, 110 U. S. 347 (1884); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887); Powell 
v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888). 
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 383 (1898). 
Jenkens v. Fowler, 24 Pa. 308 (1855). 
69 S. Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505 (1854). 
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done with "just cause and excuse."70 And "just cause and excuse" de- 
pended, at least until defined by new precedents, upon nothing more 
certain than a judgment of reasonableness. In 1921 counsel still ar- 
gued that one who accumulates currency obligations of a bank has a 
right to present them all at once, regardless of his motive or the conse- 
quences to others. But the authority of the ways of the Taney period 
had been so shattered that no case like the bank-note case of 1854 was 
even mentioned in an opinion supporting a contrary decision.71 "It is not 
enough," said Holmes, "to refer to the general right of a holder of 
checks to present them but it is necessary to consider whether the collec- 
tion of checks and presenting them in a body for the purpose of breaking 
down the plaintiff's business as now conducted is justified by the ulterior 
purpose in view." 
The checks were on small state banks in Georgia. The bulk 
presentations were by the Federal Reserve Bank, with the object of 
compelling the small banks to maintain larger reserves. The probable 
effect would have been to drive some of the small banks out of business 
and cripple the others, increasing the prosperity and power of large 
banks and diminishing banking facilities in country districts-but also 
increasing the security of deposits. In 1921 this last consideration 
weighed lighter than it might have ten years later. And there was 
more weight in the feeling that the Federal Reserve Act was not in- 
tended "to sanction this sort of warfare upon legitimate creations of the 
States." The substance of the holding was that the Reserve Bank's 
tactics were unlawful because unreasonable. 
Often, as this case illustrates, judgments of reasonableness are 
doubtful. They may vary with conditions of time and place. Judges, 
moreover, like other persons, differ in reason; and also in preposses- 
sions. And their mores are vague as to the objects at which they 
should aim when they are free to decide cases as their reasons bid them. 
The justice or social expediency of decisions of reasonableness 
might rarely be much disputed if the aim were always Bracton's, and 
judges were always sensitive to Bracton's touchstone, and could refuse 
to deal at all with questions about which powerful forces of interest 
and opinion irreconcilably conflict. But modern conditions have multi- 
plied un-Bractonian judges and hard cases. Since the mores permit 
suppression of reasons for decisions if authorities are cited, there is no 
70The landmarks are Lord Bowen's opinion in Mogul Steamship Co. v. Mc- 
Gregor, Dow & Co., 23 Q. B. D. 598 (1889); Judge Taft's in Moores v. Brick- 
layers' Union, 23 Oh. Wkly. Law Bull. 48; 10 Oh. Dec. 665 (Superior Ct. of 
Cincinnati, 1890); and Holmes's Privilege, Malice and Intent (1894), 8 HARV. 
L. REV. 1. 
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, (1921). 
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impropriety in deciding reasonableness by hunch or prepossession with- 
out close analysis and weighing of all relevant considerations, or in us- 
ing supposed absolutes of right as tests, or loose assumption that the 
interests of the acquisitive strongest coincide, in some "last analysis" 
that never has been made, with those of other persons generally. The 
modern judges for whom respect is deepest do not do such things. But 
the many instances in which they have been done in constitutional cases 
at some periods have often been followed as moral precedents by the 
judicial rank and file who carry the mores. When the question is of en- 
joining factory smoke or noise as nuisance, or of breaking a restrictive 
covenant, the losses and discomforts of householders may be slighted. 
"Reasonable" construction of old strict standards of the responsibility 
of corporate directors, and of stockholders who have got money as divi- 
dends which should have been saved for paying bills, has done not a 
little to facilitate the practice of "milking" corporations. When risk of 
loss pending transfer of title is not taken as concluded by authority, 
manufacturers are likely to be preferred to their customers. "Reason- 
able" expansion of the concept of "security title" has been largely for 
the benefit of bankers as against creditors of the buyer or the seller. 
Expansion of the concept of "property" has brought labor disputes 
within rules and principles whose application to them has no near ap- 
proach to common warrant. 
Even where reasonableness stands in the open as the apparent 
standard, traditional usuals get in the way of reasonable judges and 
excuse unreasonableness in others. Since issues, traditionally, are be- 
tween the parties only, weighty consumers' interests, not represented by 
counsel, may be ignored in unfair competition cases. In labor cases the 
conventional issues are as to the reasonableness of particular acts and 
courses; a strike may be broken because persons unknown threw stink- 
bombs, without investigation or adjustment (for which, indeed, courts 
are ill-equipped) of the substantial differences between employers and 
employed. In personal injury cases the traditional presumption that 
criteria of reasonableness can be embalmed as rules and kept sound 
throughout time, has been taken as justification for rules which tend to 
exclude consideration of reasonableness. 
The types of cases for which authority definitely prescribes rea- 
sonableness as standard are still not very numerous. But the mores 
permit occasional semi-covert resorts to reasonableness in a wide and 
increasing variety of cases. A court decides a question as it believes 
it should reasonably be decided; but, deferring to tradition, represents 
its judgment as resting upon some less indefinite-seeming rule or test, 
which it prescribes to its successors. For a while thereafter stare de- 
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cisis is taken to require that the way prescribed be followed. Whether 
the results of following it are reasonable does not become open to in- 
quiry until some judge or lawyer somehow makes it so. 
Such a confusion and alternation of ways is illustrated in a line 
of decisions as to negligence and proximate cause. An early, and there- 
fore daring, instance of open resort to considerations of reasonableness 
was in Ryan v. New York Central.72 A fire started by sparks from a 
wood-burning locomotive spread and consumed several houses in 
Syracuse. The court held that the railway company, though negligent, 
could not be made to pay the damage. Suppose the whole city had 
burned? To sustain a house-owner's claim "would subject to a liability 
against which no prudence could guard, and to meet which no private 
fortune would be adequate." House-owners, moreover, would naturally 
have insurance. The railway would not. Such reasons, however, 
seemed insufficiently legal. The notion that rights could depend on 
reasonableness had not commenced to be respectable. So the court said 
also that only the first fire started by the sparks, in a shed belonging to 
the railway, was proximate; and concluded thus: "The remoteness of 
the damage . . . forms the true rule . . . which prohibits a recovery." 
Thereafter for several years in several states physical propinquity 
was the test of liability for fires due to locomotive sparks.73 If a man's 
negligence caused a fire which destroyed his own house, the destruction 
of his next-door neighbor's house was "too remote"74-unless the 
neighbor's house was physically connected by a party wall.75 The destruc- 
tion of woodland, unlikely to have been insured, was "too remote" from 
the cause of a fire which crossed two miles of dry stubble field to reach 
it.76 
When such cases were overruled, it was usually on the theory that 
when a loss must be borne somewhere, the "guilty" rather than the 
"innocent" should bear it-provided it were a "foreseeable," or at least 
a "natural" consequence of the "guilty" act.77 In New York the test of 
physical propinquity has probably been demoted without explict over- 
ruling. The Court of Appeals still purports to maintain it. But it has 
not lately been applied in a case where the distant sufferer of loss would 
not naturally have been insured. And it was very lately held that, 
though there can be no recovery where the fire has burned across in- 
tervening land to reach the plaintiff's distant property, if it jumps across 
7235 N.Y. 210 (1866). 
3 See cases cited in notes, BOHLEN, CASES ON TORTS (3d ed. 1930) 244-5. 7 Judd v. Cushing, 50 Hun. 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888). 
75Hine v. Cushing, 53 Hun. 519 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889). 6 Hoffman v. King, 160 N.Y. 618 55 N. E. 401 (1899). 
77BOHLEN, loc. cit. supra note 73. Smith v. L. & S.W. Ry. Co., L. R. 6 
C. P. 14, (1870). Cf. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927). 
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the intervening land without burning anything there, the plaintiff can 
recover. For "the intervening land, no part of which has been touched 
by fire, provides no element of causation."78 
In the case in which this reason was stated as controlling, the plain- 
tiff's property was insured, and it might have been unnatural for the 
defendant to carry insurance against liability for damage to it. This 
may have been considered, and deemed outweighed by the fact that the 
fire originated from an explosion of gasoline which the defendant had 
in storage for commercial distribution. No one can tell whether these 
facts counted, perhaps not even the judges. For in spite of the com- 
monness of covert free decisions controlled by convictions of justice or 
reasonableness, it is still commonly regarded as essential to represent 
them as controlled by, or at least as consistent with, some rule or doc- 
trine of law-in-books. And it is not considered professionally proper to 
disclose what actually induced them. 
The much discussed Palsgraf case79 is a less doubtful illustration of 
irrelevance of stated grounds to actual. A railway guard, as such guards 
do many times a day, had pushed a passenger aboard a crowded suburban 
train. A paper bag the passenger was carrying fell. The bag contained 
fireworks, which exploded, knocking over a penny scale at a point 
physically remote on the station platform. The scale struck the plain- 
tiff, injuring her. The jury found that the guard was negligent. The 
Court of Appeals, divided four to three, reversed the judgment against 
the railway company. The opposing views of reasonableness must have 
been about as follows: 
Majority: Such an accident could happen in any jostling crowd. The 
fact that it happened in a railway station, with a railway servant an active 
jostler, is fortuitous. Suppose it had happened on Fifth Avenue; as well 
charge any jostling office boy and his perhaps struggling employer in that case 
as the railway here. Since jostling in public places is normal in urban life, 
and risk of explosion is not normally incident to it, it should be classed as a 
risk against which no one not responsible for the presence of explosives should 
be required to insure another. 
Minority: All sorts of risks are incident to the jostlings inescapable in 
cities. Attempts to distinguish degrees of normality or naturalness can lead 
only to legal artificiality and confusion. Risks must often lie where they fall, 
whatever the hardships. But general convenience requires that active con- 
tributors to such risks, if their pecuniary resources are sufficient, should insure 
their less active and usually less pecunious fellows against them wherever the 
imposition of such an insurer's burden seems practicable and not undue. Here 
the railway company, for private profit, assembles jostling crowds and jams 
78Homac Corporation v. Sun Oil Co., 258 N.Y. 462, 180 N. E. 172 (1932). 
79Palsgraf v. L. I. R. R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928). See GREEN, 
JUDGE AND JURY (1930) c. 8; Cf. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE 
COMMON LAW (1931) c. 7. 
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people into trains. Its charges are, or can be made (this was before the de- 
pression), sufficient to cover insurance against the ensuing risks. To make the 
railway an insurer, especially or at least when its own servants, even if careful, 
are active agents, is no more undue than making newspapers insurers against 
non-negligent unintended libels.8 
Between these opposing views of the mandate of reason for the 
Palsgraf case, there seems, as often, to be no better determinant of 
choice than the toss of a coin. It can scarcely be doubted that some such 
views determined the opposing conclusions of the judges-who could 
not, however, consistently with usual form-of-words-ways in such ac- 
tions, have said so. The guard's fault, if any, was completely immaterial 
in either view of reasonableness. Both opinions, nevertheless, bowed 
to convention by representing culpable negligence as material. 
In the dissenting opinion, however, Judge Andrews made a notable 
contribution towards the downfall of mechanical ways of deciding ques- 
tions of "proximate cause." The negligence, he said, was proximate 
enough to the injury. "What we mean by the word 'proximate' is, that 
because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, 
the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain 
point. This is not logic. It is practical politics. ... It is all a question 
of expediency." 
In the majority opinion Judge Cardozo treated the question of 
proximate causation as immaterial. It must be taken that the guard was 
negligent. But if the jury found him negligent with respect to the 
distant plaintiff, they went beyond the evidence. The verdict cannot 
stand-for the negligence, if any, was with respect to the passenger 
carrying the bag of fireworks. 
Thus a decision which seems almost surely to have been based upon 
"considerations of policy and social advantage" is again, as in the Ryan 
case, so dressed as to leave for future cases a standard inviting to Me- 
chanical Judicature. "Negligence to whom?" will often be the question. 
Answers to it will often be real as well as formal grounds of decision, 
even where consideration of reasonable allocation of risk would lead to 
contrary decisions which nearly everyone would regard as just. 
A situation which the New York courts have not yet finally dealt 
with illustrates the confusing tendency of compliance with the usage of 
employing conventional legal concepts as if as grounds or explanations 
of reasonable "free" decisions which were in fact reached on grounds 
left unstated. When the New York elevated railways were built, their 
80 As in Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185 (1909); Vizetelly v. Mudie's, Se- 
lect Library [1900] 2 Q.B. 170; Morrison v. Ritchie, 39 Scottish L. Rep. 432 
(1902); Hulton v. Jones [1910] A. C. 20. Cf. liability for cattle, text above note 
15, supra. 
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noise and vibration impaired the value of abutting land. The Railway 
Company was required to pay abutting owners the difference between 
the value of their land before and after. The actual inducing reason, of 
course, was as when cattle break a fence and destroy crops-feeling that 
as between the more active agent or maintainer of the injurious agency 
and the passive sufferer, the former should bear the loss. But so to ex- 
plain the award of compensation to the abutting owners would have been 
even more legal-morally shocking in 1880 than it would to-day. The 
compensation was described as for property taken-the "property" 
being in immunity from impairment of value by noise and vibration. 
Since the Railway Company took property, it must have the property 
taken. So it was thenceforth taxed on its "value." On East 42nd 
Street (where the "spur" was from Third Avenue to the Grand Central 
Station) the abutting owners got for their "property taken" about 
$200,000 some fifty years ago. Lately the elevated structure in East 
42nd Street, having become obsolete, was removed, pursuant to a statute 
providing that the abutting owners be assessed the "costs, compensa- 
tion," etc., incident to the removal. The Railway Company demanded as 
compensation for this "taking" of its "property" (its right, that is, to 
inflict noise and vibration) its "value"-to be measured, of course, by 
present cost of reproduction, which then, just before the depression, 
would have been about six million dollars. It seems clear, from the 
lower courts' opinions, that it will not get anything like that sum-but 
clear also that it will get something, and that the something will be 
called "value of property taken."81 
Here, as in the Palsgraf case, it would still be legal-morally im- 
proper to present the inevitably "free" decision nakedly upon the 
grounds which actually induce it. Cardozo says truly that "the judge, 
sl Since operation of the Elevated "Spur" had long been at a loss, the Railway 
Company has been awarded no compensation for the taking of its franchise and 
right to occupy the street. But the lower courts hold that it is entitled to the 
"value" of its "so-called rights to impair easements of ligh, air and access"-in- 
cluding those acquired by prescription (against owners who omitted to go after 
compensation for the impairment of their light, air and access by noise and vibra- 
tion fifty years ago) as well as those which it acquired by purchase in condemna- 
tion of constructively equivalent proceedings. See Notes: A Constructive "Prop- 
erty Right" and its "Value," (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1074; Valuation of Easements in Condemnation of Elevated Railroads, ibid. 779; The Elevated Railway Con- demnation Case-Another Analysis of the Property Interests Involved, ibid. 1309. 
Leading cases as to the abutting owners' right to compensation were Story v. N.Y. Elevated R. Co., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882); American Bank Note Co. v. N.Y. 
Elevated R. Co., 129 N. Y. 252, 29 N. E. 302 (1891). As to the Railway Company's 
compensation, see In re Elevated Railroad Structure in East 42nd Street, 126 Misc. 879, 216 N.Y. Supp. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1926), modified 229 App. Div. 617, 243 N.Y. Supp. 665 (lst Dept. 1930); 141 Misc. 565, 253 N.Y. Supp. 743 and 143 Misc. 129, 257 N.Y. Supp. 37 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 238 App. Div. 832, 262 N.Y. Supp. 973 (lst Dept. 1933), and leave granted to appeal to the Court 
of Appeals, 239 App. Div. 779 and 781, 263 N. Y. Supp. 949 (lst Dept. 1933). 
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even when he is free, is still not wholly free."82 Within a wide vague 
area, free decision has become reputable. But in most of that area it is 
still not reputable for the judge to rest his free decisions openly upon 
the considerations which lead him to them. As a practical matter, 
therefore, the power of a socially benevolent judge to give legal effect, 
in instances, to his ideals, depends upon his mastery and use of an ar- 
tificial technique. 
The multiplication of instances of free decision is augmenting 
facilities for representing future instances as sufficiently consistent with 
stare decisis to satisfy the mores. Such decisions are commonly pre- 
cedents either for newly discovered principles or standards or for ex- 
tended applications of old ones. Stare decisis comes more and more 
to mean that decided standards should stand ahead of rules. Though 
narrow rules are still often blindly followed, "we are tending more and 
more toward an appreciation of the truth that, after all, there are few 
rules; there are chiefly standards and degrees."83 Standards and judg- 
ments of degree are flexible. Even if the catch-pool standard-justice 
or reasonableness under whatever may be the circumstances-cannot 
respectably appear naked, probably almost any decision that most people 
would deem just or reasonable can be made to look consistent enough 
with stare decisis to seem respectable. What, indeed, might not be 
presented acceptably through the technique of the Funk case84-i.e., 
stare decisis requires that the decided principle that "the common law 
by its own principles adapts itself to changed conditions" prevail over 
stare decisis? 
But though stare decisis may thus on occasion seem to commit 
suicide, it springs to life again from its own corpse. According to 
Cardozo,85 
"We have to distinguish between the precedents which are merely static, 
and those which are dynamic. Because the former outnumber the latter many 
times, a sketch of the judicial process which concerns itself almost exclusively 
with the creative or dynamic element, is likely to give a false impression, an 
overcolored picture, of uncertainty in the law and of free discretion in the 
judge. Of the cases that come before the court in which I sit,8 a majority, I 
think, could not with semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one. 
... .In countless litigations, the law is so clear that judges have no discretion." 
Of course there are not a few judges who decide as they like whenever 
for any reason (sometimes a sinister one) it seems to them importantly 
82 THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 141. 
83Ibid. 161. 
84290 U. S. 371 (1933), discussed in 34 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 864 ff. 
85 Op. cit. supra note 82, 163-4, 129. 6 Then of course the New York Court of Appeals. 
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desirable to do so,87 claiming compulsion of authority or reason, as the 
case may be, merely to cloak their bias. Conscientious judges, however, 
still feel for the most part bound, not free. A great many of the cases 
in which they feel bound are such that most sensible persons would 
agree that justice and general convenience require them, in those cases, 
to adhere to legal usuals. No one would want to feel uncertain about 
the rule of the road, or as to the enforcibleness, under ordinary condi- 
tions, of contracts that have the quality of mutual beneficence which 
characterizes primitive reciprocities.88 
But the cases in which "the law is so clear that judges have no 
discretion" include also a large number in which their submission to 
conventional legal-moral duty has results which few would call just or 
reasonable. Even Cardozo feels that a court cannot properly make it 
unsafe for speculators to do business through irresponsible dummies.89 
And he could not persuade his court that a fair written contract could 
change rights vested by a prior contract under seal.0 Though reason- 
ableness has considerably relaxed old rigidities of contracts under 
cover of "implied conditions," courts still feel found to enforce con- 
tract provisions which manifestly would not be as they are if the parties 
had stood "in the equality of position . . . in which freedom of contract 
begins."91 It is matter of course that the death of the owner of a building 
in which an elevator accident had occurred should relieve the company 
which insured him against liability for such accidents from compensating 
the victim.92 In a case reminding of the fosse case in the Year Book,93 
"correct procedure," as subsequently determined (few if any competent 
lawyers would have known what it was before the decision), was lately 
deemed more important than that a surety should have to pay a twenty 
thousand dollar judgment after its reversal.94 The Funk case95 belatedly 
87Cf. GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCEs OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1921) 290: "Of 
course, the motive of a judge's opinion may be almost anything-a bribe, a woman's 
blandishments, the desire to favor the administration or his political party, or to 
gain popular favor or influence." If these, in Gray's language, are not sources of 
the law "which Jurisprudence can recognize as legitimate," a truthful jurispru- 
dence must notwithstanding recognize that they are actual. 88 See ante, text above note 6 supra. 
Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 264, 146 N. E. 374 (1925), discussed by CAR- 
DOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928) 70-72. 9 Cammack v. Slattery, 241 N. Y. 39, 148 N. E. 781 (1925). 
Holmes, J., dissenting in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 27 (1915). 
'Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933). It does not appear in the opin- 
ion either that the case was defended by an insurance company or that the usual- 
ness of covering elevator accident liability by insurance would be deemed material. 
3 Supra note 29. 9 Anderson, an employee of the Singer Sewing Machine Company, inflicted 
personal injuries upon Mrs. Baldwin by negligent driving. A judgment for just 
under $20,000 against both Anderson and the Singer Company was affirmed as to An- 
derson; but reversed as to the Singer Company on the ground that there was 
no evidence to support a finding that Anderson had been "in the course of his 
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abolished but a single petty member of a large class of technicalities of 
evidence and procedure whose injustices, by anybody's standard, have 
employment" at the time of the injury. Baldwin v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 
49 Idaho 231, 287 Pac. 944 (1930). 
The two defendants had appealed jointly. The appeal bond ran thus: 
WHEREAS the Singer Company [there was no mention of Anderson] has appealed 
and desires to stay execution; Now THEREFORE the American Surety Company 
acknowledges itself bound "that if the said judgment appealed from, or any part 
thereof, be affirmed," the appellant will pay the amount "as to which said judg- 
ment shall be affirmed"; and "if the said appellant does not make such payment 
within thirty days from the filing of the remittitur," judgment may be entered on 
motion against the surety. On the expiration of the thirty days from the affirm- 
ance as to Anderson, Mrs. Baldwin, on ex parte motion, entered judgment against 
the Surety Company. This judgment was promptly vacated on motion of the 
Surety Company. On Mrs. Baldwin's appeal, the vacating order was reversed, on 
the ground that the Surety Company ought to have appealed instead of moving 
to vacate. Baldwin v. Anderson, 50 Idaho 606, 299 Pac. 341 (1931). 
The Surety Company then appealed from the ex parte judgment; but as its 
time to appeal from that judgment had expired during the period between the 
vacation and the reversal of the order of vacation, the appeal was dismissed. 
Baldwin v. Anderson, 51 Idaho 614, 8 P.(2d) 461 (1932). 
The lower court's denial of a second motion by the Surety Company to "cor- 
rect and then vacate" the judgment was affirmed. Baldwin v. Anderson, 52 Idaho 
243, 13 P.(2d) 650 (1932). The State Supreme Court declined throughout to con- 
sider the correctness of the judgment, its position being that the judgment, however 
erroneous, was not void, and therefore not subject to attack on motion. The 
lower court had jurisdiction to enter it. Only on a timely appeal from the judg- 
ment could the question whether the lower court ought to have entered it be 
considered by the Supreme Court. It was immaterial that the judgment had been 
vacated on motion and was not in effect (unless a judgment can somehow be in 
effect notwithstanding the fact that the records of the court whose judgment it 
was say that it has been vacated) when the Surety Company's time to appeal 
from it ran and expired. 
Meanwhile the Surety Company had gone to the federal courts. The District 
Judge held that comity precluded his court from toucliing a matter of which the 
state courts had first acquired jurisdiction; the federal courts, moreover are con- 
cluded by the state court's construction of state procedural statutes. Amer. 
Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 51 F.(2d) 596 (D. Idaho, 1931). This was reversed 
by the Circuit Court of Appeals: the Surety Company's consent that judgment be 
entered against it on ex parte motion was only in case the Singer Company failed 
to pay a judgment against itself; it had not undertaken that the Singer Company 
would pay a judgment against Anderson; therefore the ex parte judgment was 
without due process of law, and void. 55 F.(2d) 555 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932). 
In the Supreme Court of the United States, certiorari to the State Supreme 
Court was dismissed, and the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals was re- 
versed. In the state courts the Surety Company's claim of deprivation without 
due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment was made for the 
first time on motion for rehearing. This was too late. There was no denial of 
due process by the state, moreover, for the state law gave the Surety Company a 
due procedure-by appeal-for relief from the judgment entered without notice 
and without its consent. The Company's mistake of remedy gives it no ground 
to claim deprivation without due process. The state court's decisions made the 
validity of the ex parte judgment res judicata. There must be an end to litigation. 
A party who has been beaten in a state court of competent jurisdiction cannot 
try the same issues over again in a federal court. American Surety Co. v. Bald- 
win, 287 U. S. 156 (1932). 
On the grounds stated in this opinion, the Federal District Court has en- 
joined the Surety Company from proceeding in the state courts with a suit in 
equity to restrain Baldwin from enforcing the ex parte judgment. Am. Surety 
Co. v. Baldwin, 2 F. Supp. 679 (D. Idaho, 1933). 
95 290 U. S. 371 (1933), supra note 84. 
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become more striking than their convenience to the administration of 
justice.96 
But though many old clarities of rigid rule and absolute right still 
seem unblurred, moral assurance that they will remain so tends con- 
stantly to weaken. It is still unlikely that "a mortgagee would be pre- 
vented from foreclosing because he acted from disinterested malevo- 
lence and not from a desire to get his money."97 But it is no longer 
unthinkable. Even if there were no depression a court might restrain 
a malevolent foreclosure without deep shock to the profession. The 
limits of moral permission of judicial resort to reasonableness are al- 
ways widening. 
In the constitutional field from the beginning, judicial convictions 
respecting the commands of right and reason contended for constitu- 
tional sovereignty with the original intent and meaning of the written 
instrument. The conquest of the Due Process clauses was their de- 
cisive victory. That won, resistance dwindled. The provisions of the 
nuclear instrument became useful mainly for mnemonic convenience. 
Without them as pegs on and between which to drape the living Con- 
stitution, constitutional lawyers would not have known how to keep 
what they knew of it in any sort of serviceable order. 
With growth, however, the living Constitution is tending back 
towards intelligible simplicity. Understanding of the acquired meaning 
of the Due Process clause makes all the rest easy to understand. Con- 
stitutional questions differ only superficially. Each is described as in- 
volving one or more particular provisions of the instrument, or some 
doctrine said to be derived therefrom-for instance that of the immunity 
of federal instrumentalities from state control. Most questions, how- 
ever, whatever their verbal forms, are in substance Due Process ques- 
tions of reasonableness under the circumstances.98 Though drivers of 
federal mail trucks cannot be required to have driving licenses,99 right 
and reason require that states be free to interrupt their discharge of fed- 
eral duties by arrest if they are charged with murder.100 It is unreasonable, 
even though in no wise inconsistent with any Congressional regulation 
of commerce, that every state through which it passes should be free to 
levy tonnage taxes on freight in transit between Boston and San Fran- 
cisco.101 It is reasonable that Congress should regulate local transactions 
See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 83. See also Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 1217; Place of Trial-Interstate Applica- 
tion of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment (1930) 44 id. 41. 
97 Holmes, J., in the Federal Reserve Bank case, supra note 71. 98 See CORWIN, STORRS LECTURES AT YALE (1934)-title for publication not yet determined. 
"Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51 (1920). 
00United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 482 (1868). 
101Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 232 (1873). 
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and businesses when its policies with respect to interstate commerce 
would otherwise be thwarted.102 It is reasonable also that federal author- 
ities should deal with instances of vice and crime which the swiftness of 
travel makes it hard for states to reach.103 When circumstances make it 
reasonable, both Congress and the states may abridge freedom of speech 
and press,104 or impair the obligation of contract.105 That a question in 
form involves some other than the Due Process clause often makes no 
difference except in the names of cases chosen for citation as authorita- 
tive. Right and reason, as judicially construed, so normally determine 
decisions that study of the personnel of the Supreme Court outweighs 
knowledge of precedents under particular rubrics in usefulness for con- 
stitutional prediction. 
The living Constitution is therefore simpler than it used to be. 
But it is still complicated by hang-overs of old ways at common law. 
Judges have not given up the practice of presenting decisions as con- 
sistent both with original intent or meaning and with precedents. And 
since they attempt this seriously and sincerely, their constructions of 
right and reason are often warped, and sometimes even kept from 
counting, by supposed obligations of fidelity to the past. 
Actual fidelity to both original intent and precedents is usually im- 
possible. For most of the important precedents-those in line with most 
of those cited two paragraphs back, for instance, and all those apply- 
ing the expanded meaning of due process of law-are manifestly incon- 
sistent both with the meaning of constitutional language as understood 
when adopted and with any intent which could then safely have been 
expressed in public. Two ways of escape from the impossible task of 
duplex fidelity compete in usage. One, available because few people 
really know much about original intent, is to take for granted that it is 
expressed by such of the precedents in point as accord with the deciders' 
views of right and reason. Thus, at a time when butter is selling for 
not much more than fifteen cents a pound, a decision sustaining a tax of 
fifteen cents a pound on wholesome butter substitutes may be compelled 
by the precedented doctrine that the collateral purposes of legislatures in 
levying taxes are beyond the scope of judicial inquiry ;106 or a contrary 
decision, if deemed more reasonable, might be as authoritatively com- 
pelled by the doctrine that an arbitrary tax is not really a tax at all, but 
102 Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930); Stafford v. 
Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922). 
103 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917). See Corwin, Congress's 
Power to Prohibit Commerce (1933) 18 CORN. L. Q. 477, 491-3. 
104 Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U. S. 652 (1925). 05Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
06 A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 54 Sup. Ct. 599 (1934). 
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a confiscation of property.107 "Constitutional principles ... as they 
are written"'08 may similarly establish the fidelity to original intent of 
whichever decision a majority of the court elects with respect to a regu- 
lation of rates or prices. The doctrine of hard-and-fast exemption of 
most businesses from such regulation was written so lately'09 that its 
recent unwriting"0 (at least for the time being) occasions little sur- 
prise. 
The alternative way of escape is to find underneath both written 
instrument and precedents a deeper and truer original intent than those 
apparent on their surfaces. This way is still in course of improvement 
by experiment. When perfected it may come to this: The real, true, 
all-pervasive, profoundly fundamental and dominant original intent was 
that the whole and every part of the written instrument should conduce 
to general welfare. The framers and adopters knew-who does not ?- 
that conditions change, and that a measure which would subvert welfare 
at one time may promote it at another. It must therefore have been 
and therefore was intended that constitutional provisions be elastic; that 
every granted power extend as far as the circumstances of whatever 
may be the moment make right and reasonable; and that limitations 
should similarly stretch and shrink with changing circumstances. It 
would follow, for example, that if the conditions of a time of depression 
were such that a debtors' moratorium would undermine "the confidence 
essential to prosperous trade,""' the moratorium would be forbidden by 
the Contract Clause; it would not be forbidden, however, if the condi- 
tions of the depression were such that the moratorium would tend to 
restore confidence. So read, the Constitution is unchanging; for it is al- 
ways the same as the right and reason whose imperatives change with 
conditions. And all past decisions can be deemed consistent with its in- 
tent-at least in aim, even if a good many of them were misses. 
Free constitutional decision could thus be reconciled with con- 
secrated constitutional beliefs much as free decision in other fields 
could, through the technique of the Funk case, be reconciled with stare 
decisis. But even in constitutional law, free ways are still in tug of 
war with old ways of common lawyers. There are still cases in which 
precedented standards are applied without thought or claim of right 
17 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922). 
For other antithetical pairs among "constitutional doctrines as they are writ- 
ten," see CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 98; also Note (by Harry Shulman), The 
Supreme Court's Attitude toward Liberty of Contract and Freedom of Speech 
(1931) 41 YALE L.J. 262. 
10s Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 445 (1927). 109 See Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1089. 0 Nebbia v. New York, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934). 
1 Moratorium case, supra note 105. 
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or reason. Not long ago, for instance, the reasonableness of protecting 
immigrants from frauds by steamship ticket agents was deemed irrele- 
vant to the question of the validity of a state statute with that object; for 
steamships carry foreign commerce.112 And when it was decided that 
regulation of fees charged by employment agencies is unconstitutional, 
one judge concurred on the sole ground that in another case regulation 
of theatre ticket brokers' charges had been held unwarrantable.1l3 
Such mechanical submission to stare decisis, though still common, 
now often seems extraordinary in cases where it would have been taken 
as matter of course in Taney's time. It becomes conceivable that rea- 
sonableness is superseding stare decisis as the paramount obligation in 
judicial mores-that it may even come to be felt as improper to follow 
precedents except where, as probably in a great majority of cases, do- 
ing so could be defended as reasonable. 
Such a change of basic obligation would not ipso facto end confu- 
sion in judicial ways. There might be little diversity as to reasonable- 
ness in every-day cases where ways which come near to having com- 
mon warrant are already established in use or easily discoverable. But 
as to the most important matters which courts deal with .in a society 
deeply divided in interests and opinions, constructions of reasonable- 
ness might be as various and conflicting as they are at present. "Propo- 
sitions as to public policy rarely are unanimously accepted, and still 
more rarely, if ever, are capable of unanswerable proof." And they 
are still commonly acted on "rather as inarticulate instincts than as defi- 
nite ideas for which a rational defence is ready."114 Even, moreover, 
where reasonableness was undisputed, fidelity to obligation to decide 
reasonably would depend upon what men were judges and what powers 
of persons, driven by what interests and opinions, they looked to chiefly 
for backing and approval. Whatever moral ways and standards were 
nominally respected, it could still be law in some places that extortion and 
homicide by powerfully protected persons are ordinarily exempt from 
prosecution. And the sophist's art of "making the worse appear to be 
the better reason" would not go out of use so long as credit could be 
gained by experts in it. 
But unless Spengler is right in believing that mysterious forces be- 
yond human control are whirling Occidental societies towards an inexor- 
able destiny of death,115 there is no reason to suppose that legal unsatis- 
112 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34 (1927). 
113 Separate concurrence of Sanford, J., in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 359 (1928). 
114 Holmes, J., dissenting in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N. E. 
1077, 1081 (1896). 
15 DECLINE OF THE WEST (1926, 1928). 
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factoriness would be relatively greater than it is at present. With release 
from fetters of tradition, it seems certain that many legal ways of almost 
undisputed unreasonableness would cease to be followed, and probable 
that reasonableness would become an object of study instead of guess. 
And it is possible that wise men would discover the essentials of a body 
of law with which satisfaction would be general, and solve the engineering 
problem of how to generate man-power enough to make their legal ideals 
facts. 
VI 
THE DECAY OF LEGAL ILLUSIONS 
Whether for better or worse, it seems unlikely that ways derived 
from medieval illusion about the nature of law will be maintained much 
longer in judicial mores, unless as empty forms. 
There is some vitality left in old illusions. Practicing lawyers still 
tend "to regard the doctrines of the system in which they have been 
trained as parts of the legal order of nature.""6 They can sometimes be 
heard to say that some recent decision of their highest court is "not law" 
because contrary to those doctrines. If they bother to attend and listen, 
they applaud the priestly rhetoric of leaders of their profession in public 
addressesll7-in which, however, the object set up for reverent adulation 
is more likely to be the courts than the law. In court their professional 
mores require them to seem to wrangle rather about the mandate of au- 
thority than the reasonable disposition of the case, as if assuming that 
authority is binding upon appellate judges. They know well, however, that 
no case is so binding upon their court as one lately decided by the persons 
who now compose it; and that the way to win cases is by reaching the 
hearts and prepossessions of those persons.1l8 But if, for practical pur- 
poses, they take law as "the will of the judges," they do not say so. 
Laymen too still stick to traditional ways of talking about law. They 
ask their lawyer friends what the law is as to this or that, and express sur- 
prise if they get a doubtful answer. But they know well enough that law 
suits are uncertain. They are not surprised if they are told that a case 
will probably result in a way that seems to them outrageous. Usually 
they are quite free from illusion that law is always just or reasonable. 
Not uncommonly, indeed, their loose opinions of law and courts are far 
more cynical and disrespectful than unreverent lawyers with ampler in- 
formation would deem warranted. In the past year the "man in street" 
11 Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (1911) 24 HARV. 
L. REV. 591, 602. 
117Arnold, Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 617, 621-4. 
118 See Bachrach, Reflections on Brief Writing (1932) 27 ILL. L. REV. 374. 
1072 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.224 on Sat, 15 Jun 2013 20:07:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TOWARDS LEGAL UNDERSTANDING: II 
of not much economic consequence has often been amazed when told that 
Recovery legislation is likely to be held constitutional-not because he 
has mystical notions of constitutionality, but because he is used to believ- 
ing that the Supreme Court always kills everything that might give the 
little fellow a chance. He has no illusion that law orders and adjusts 
things "in a fixed, absolutely predetermined way, excluding all merely in- 
dividual feelings or desires of those by whom the ordering and adjust- 
ment are carried out." His illusion is rather that his own desires and 
feelings can have no influence upon law. 
As early as 1864 the fictitious character of the assumption that law 
is found, not made, was openly indicated in a judicial opinion.119 And 
in all the years since I doubt if any important judge has let fall a pious 
statement of the nature of Marshall's in Osborne v. The Bank120 or 
Story's in Swift v. Tyson.121 To do so would seem simple-minded. Those 
who still advocate maintaining the pious fiction do not ask intelligent per- 
sons to believe it. They contend only that it is salutary for the vulgar; 
that social order depends upon popular respect for law, and that popular 
respect for law depends upon illusion about it.122 Popular respect for law 
depends much more upon belief that it is just, and regardful of popular in- 
terests. And diminution of that belief by judges who are partisan or me- 
chanical has not been fully counterbalanced by judges who look for ways 
of dealing which will come close to having common warrant. If law which 
deserves respect is the object of desire, disrespect for law when it deserves 
it, even if greater than law as a whole deserves, may be more salutary than 
illusion. 
Another attempted pragmatic justification of fiction was this by 
Schofield :123 
"No judge in England or the United States ever did need to be told, I think, 
that he has power to make law, but many judges in the United States have 
needed to be reminded from time to time, vi et armis, of the constitutional and 
"l "The Supreme Court of Iowa is not the first or the only court which has 
changed its rulings on questions as important as the one now presented. I under- 
stand the doctrine to be in such cases, not that the law is changed, but that it was 
always the same as expounded by the later decision, and that the former decision 
was not, and never had been, the law, and is overruled for that very reason." 
Miller, J., dissenting in Gelpcke v. Dubuque, supra note 56, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 175, 
211 (1864). 
0 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 738, 866 (1824), supra note 39. 
1216 Pet. (U.S.) 1, 18 (1842): "It will hardly be contended that the de- 
cisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the 
laws are." 
122 See the views of Demogue and Wurtzel, summarized in FRANK, LAW AND 
THE MODERN MIND (1930) 222-235. Many American jurists have held these views, 
but usually without exposing them in print. 
13 Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made Law in State and Federal 
Courts (1910) 4 ILL. L. REV. 533, 536-7 and note. 
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legal restraints binding upon them, when engaged in the judicial process of 
making law. . . . When you say judges only declare pre-existing law, and do not 
make new law, you emphasize those restraints and keep them fresh in the 
memory better than when you say judges make law .... The 'fiction' that 
judges only declare law is all that stands between us and a judicial autocracy." 
In other words, by telling your child that the cookies are locked up when 
he knows well that they are not, you can keep him from violating your 
prohibition of taking cookies, which anyway is "binding upon him." If 
you could make him believe the cookies were locked up, it might re- 
strain him. But it would be as hard to induce a twentieth century court 
to believe the fiction that judges only declare law as to get a twelve-year- 
old to believe in Santa Claus. The most he will do is pretend to believe 
for the benefit of the younger children. And he will stop doing that 
when their sophistication becomes such that it makes him look silly to 
them. 
The fiction of judicial impotence seems just about to have died with 
realization that there is no use pretending any longer. There is more 
life left in the illusion that "constitutional and legal restraints" can be 
valid, or "binding upon" judges, for some other and higher reason than 
that a sufficient power of persons makes them so. Obviously the "re- 
straints" (presumably traditional legal-moral standards) to which Scho- 
field referred as "binding upon" judges were not binding them in fact. 
That was his grievance. When an ideal or standard seems desirable or 
excellent, it has often had propaganda value to proclaim that it is bind- 
ing or valid in the inception of a movement to make it so.124 But de 
facto validity depends upon power. A court, through its power of phys- 
ical coercion, can validate any decision or standard which its public will 
put up with. But nothing can make a standard binding upon judges 
(or perhaps persuasiveness is the limit of possibility) except a pressure 
of high man-power. The man-power of moral pressure for traditional 
restraints on courts has been diminishing for generations. I suspect 
that pressure for judicial freedom to deal reasonably is now stronger. 
The forms of belief that judges are bound by the legislation of their 
predecessors are still observed. But scepticism is rife and profound con- 
viction is rare, though belief handed down through all the changes in 
conditions since Bracton's time is still skin-deep in countless vague and 
unobservant persons. Such belief generates little man-power, es- 
pecially in conditions when most of the believers would rather be wrong 
than right, at least with respect to the bindingness of much of the con- 
14 See the analysis of the "natural rights" talk which fanned revolutionary 
fires in the eighteenth century in BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHT- 
EENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS (1932). 
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stitutional legislation of the Supreme Court in former periods. In these 
conditions those who, like Mr. James M. Beck,125 despairingly insist 
upon transcendental notions of constitutional validity, seem to be talk- 
ing to the echoes in an empty lecture hall. 
WALTER NELLES 
YALE LAW SCHOOL 
125 See his speeches and articles on the constitutionality of the National Re- 
covery Act, 77 CONG. REC. (1933) 2935 ff., CONG. DIGEST (Dec., 1933) 301, 8 
FORTUNE (1933) 48. 
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